基于平均单调博弈广义解的收益再分配模型  

Model of profit reallocation based on generalized solution in average monotonic game

作　　者：李翠[1,2] 薛昱[3] 王文胜[4] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710048 [2]西安财经学院信息学院,西安710100 [3]北京信息控制研究所研究生管理部,北京100037 [4]西北工业大学自动化学院,西安710072

出　　处：《控制与决策》2015年第4期645-654,共10页Control and Decision

基　　金：国防基础科研计划基金项目(A0420131501);全国统计科学研究计划项目(2013LY069);陕西省教育厅专项科研计划项目(14JK1274)

摘　　要：对经典合作博弈的核心及谈判集解进行延拓,定义了广义核心及广义谈判集的概念,提出广义比例分配模型及简化博弈模型,探讨了平均单调博弈与广义简化博弈的对应关系以及广义比例分配与广义核心解的包含关系,证明了平均单调博弈广义核心解与谈判集解的等价性质.研究结果丰富了对合作博弈解的研究及其在收益再分配领域中的应用需求,说明了平均单调博弈广义核心解的非空性,进而保证了其最优再分配方案的存在性.The core and bargaining set of classical cooperative game are expanded, and the generalized core and bargaining set are defined. The models of the generalized proportional distribution and the reduced game are provided, the correspondence between average monotonic game and generalized reduced game is discussed, and the inclusion relationship between generalized proportional distribution and generalized core is provided. The equivalence property of the generalized core and bargaining set in average monotonic game is proved. The result not only enriches the study of solutions in cooperative game and application requirements in the field of profit reallocation, but also provides the nonempty property of the generalized core in the average monotonic game, which indicates that the optimal reallocation scheme is existent.

关 键 词：简化博弈 平均单调博弈 广义核心 广义谈判集 再分配 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]