复杂产品共性技术研发的政府最优成本补贴  

The optimal government cost subsidies for R&D of the complex product generic technology

作　　者：程永波[1] 李婷[2] 陈洪转[2] 舒亮亮[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210046 [2]南京航空航天大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211106

出　　处：《哈尔滨工程大学学报》2015年第3期432-436,共5页Journal of Harbin Engineering University

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71002046;71372080);江苏省社科基金重点资助项目(11GLA003)

摘　　要：为发挥政府资助的最优杠杆作用,探究政府在复杂产品共性技术研发中最优成本补贴,从政府分担研发成本的角度,运用博弈模型构建了一个主制造商与一个供应商协同研发、政府扶持下的共性技术研发成本分摊模型,并分析求解了Nash非合作博弈和合作博弈下的政府研发成本最优补贴比例以及主制造商、供应商的最优物质性成本投入,最后基于所构建的模型进行了算例分析。研究表明,复杂产品共性技术的"共性度"和产品复杂度与政府对主制造商和供应商补贴比例成正比,主制造商供应商的物质性成本投入与政府的补贴比例成正比,其研发成果带给主制造商和供应商的利润也与政府补贴比例成正比。In this paper,the role of the optimal leverage of government funding and the optimal cost subsidy by the government in the research and development of complex products＇ generic technology are explored. It starts from the perspective of the government that bears some cost of research and development. Next,it employs the game model to build a cost allocation model of generic technology based on the collaborative research of one main manufacturer plus one supplier and the government support. After that,it analyzes and gets the optimal ratio of subsidy by government and the optimal material cost of the main manufacturer and supplier under the Nash non-cooperative game and cooperative game. Finally,an analysis is made based on the constructed model. The study showed that the universal degree and complexity of complex product＇s generic technology is directly proportional to the ratio of subsidy by government. The material costs of the main manufacturers and suppliers are directly proportional to subsidy ratio of government and the profit brought by research achievements is also directly proportional to ratio of subsidy by government.

关 键 词：复杂产品 共性技术 成本补贴 合作博弈 成本分担 努力水平 

分 类 号：F204[经济管理—国民经济]