政企关联与地方政府环境信息公开:秉公抑或包庇  

Political Connections and Local Government's Environmental Information Disclosure

作　　者：郭红彩[1] 姚圣[2] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430073 [2]中国矿业大学管理学院,江苏徐州221116

出　　处：《财经论丛》2014年第9期60-67,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金资助项目(71102163);中国博士后基金特别资助项目(2012T50529);中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(2011M500977)

摘　　要：本文以政企关联视角,对地方政府环境信息披露问题进行研究,研究结果表明:当政企关联强度在31.17%以内时,地方政府尚能"秉公"公开环境信息;但关联强度超过31.17%时,地方政府会对关联企业进行"包庇";地方政府环境信息公开程度高的地区,政府公开信息时更会受到政企关系的影响;且地方政府在环境信息公开时更会偏袒国有企业。因此,应采用限制政企关联强度、加强对政府环境信息公开指数高的地区监管、对国有企业应由独立第三方进行信息公开等措施提升地方政府环境信息公开披露水平。From the perspective of government-enterprise connection,this paper studies the issue of environmental information disclosure by local governments. It is found that when the strength of government-enterprise connection is lower than31. 17%,local governments are capable of'impartial'disclosure of environmental information; but when the strength rises above 31. 17%,local governments will'cover up'information for connected enterprises. It is also found that in areas with higher degree of environmental information disclosure,governments are more likely under the influence of government-enterprise connection; and they will give greater favor to state-owned enterprises than to non-state-owned enterprises. Thus,to raise the level of local governments' environmental information disclosure,the paper suggests restricting the strength of connection between governments and enterprises,enhance supervision on areas with high index of public information disclosure,and introduce an independent third party to conduct information disclosure concerning state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：政企关联 环境信息公开 地方利益 

分 类 号：F235[经济管理—会计学] C93[经济管理—国民经济]