基于灰博弈模型的水利行业监管博弈及仿真  

Game and simulation of supervision of water conservancy industry based on grey game model

作　　者：毛辛培 仉明珠[3] 

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]河海大学项目管理信息化研究所,江苏南京211100 [3]河海大学企业管理学院,江苏常州213022

出　　处：《水利经济》2015年第2期54-57,77-78,共4页Journal of Economics of Water Resources

基　　金："十一五"国家科技支撑计划重大项目(2006BAB04A13);江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金(07SJD630006)

摘　　要：为提高我国水利行业工程监管效率和工程效益,运用灰色博弈理论建立水利行业工程监管过程中多主体决策的博弈模型,分析监理方和施工方的选择策略以及业主对监理方积极监理的支出补贴比率和对施工方积极施工的支出补贴比率对双方行为选择的影响,得到了灰色博弈模型的均衡策略并提出了两种比率(α、β)的最优取值范围,能够激励监理方、施工方做出有利于工程项目的行为选择,为业主对双方进行补贴提供了具体的参考意见。A game model for multi-agent decisions of water conservancy projects during supervision process is established using the grey game theory in order to promote the supervision efficiencies and benefits of projects of water conservancy industry in China. The supervisor's and constructor 's selection strategies as well as the influence of the owner's subsidy ratios to the supervisor and the constructor for their active supervision and construction on their behavior selections are analyzed. The equilibrium strategies of the grey game model are obtained,and the optimal ranges of two kinds of subsidy ratios(α, β) are proposed. It can inspire the supervisor and constructor to favorable behavior selections for the projects,and specific suggestions are put forward for the owner to provide subsidies to both of them.

关 键 词：水利行业 工程监管效率 灰色博弈模型 蒙特卡洛仿真 

分 类 号：F284[经济管理—国民经济]