高管政治关联会影响商业银行信贷投放的周期性特征吗——来自中国银行业的经验证据  

Do Political Connections of Executives Affect the Cyclical Characteristics of Commercial Banks' Lending?——Evidences from China's Banking Industry

作　　者：潘敏[1] 魏海瑞[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《财贸经济》2015年第4期60-73,共14页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"完善国有控股商业银行公司治理机制研究"(项目编号:10AZD019)

摘　　要：本文基于我国38家商业银行2003—2012年的年度非平衡面板数据,实证检验了我国商业银行高管团队政治关联对其信贷投放行为周期性特征的影响,并考察了高管团队成员年龄与海外教育背景在不同经济周期中对政治关联下的银行信贷投放行为的作用。实证结果表明,样本期间,我国商业银行的信贷投放行为表现出明显的逆周期特征,高管团队政治关联程度的提高会强化银行信贷投放的逆周期性,但这种效应会随着高管团队成员年龄的提高而弱化。同时,在当前历史阶段,高管团队中具有海外教育背景成员人数的增加或占比的上升不会对政治关联下的商业银行信贷投放周期性特征产生影响。Using an unbalanced panel data of China＇s banking industry from 2003 to 2012, this paper examines the relationships between political connections of banks＇ executives and the cyclical characteristics of banks＇ lending and the effects of bank executives＇ ages, and oversea education backgrounds on the relationships. Analysis shows that, China＇s banks＇ lending is obviously counter- cyclical during the sample period, the lending behaviors of banks with higher executives＇ political connections are more counter-cyclical. Furthermore, with the increase of executives＇ ages, the effect of executives＇ political connections on banks＇ lending behaviors is weakening, and the executives＇ oversea education background has no influence on the relationships between the executives＇ political connections and the cyclical characteristics of banks＇ lending.

关 键 词：高管政治关联 银行信贷 经济周期 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] D0[政治法律—政治学]