中国制造业企业的研发投资:创新导向与激励机制的交互作用  

R&D Investment in Chinese Manufacturing Firms: Interaction between Innovation Orientation and Managerial Incentives

作　　者：梁彤缨[1] 孙晨曦[1] 陈波[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南理工大学工商管理学院,广东广州510641

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第8期6-11,16,共7页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"基于多层嵌套随机前沿模型的中国工业企业研发效率研究"(11YJA630053)

摘　　要：利用2009年-2012年中国制造业上市公司的数据,结合企业行为理论和委托代理理论,研究创新导向和管理层激励对研发投资的交互作用。同时检验管理层激励与研发投资可能存在的非线性关系。研究结果表明,短期薪酬激励与创新导向对研发投资存在替代效应,而问题导向越明显,长期股权激励能够显著地促进企业研发投资。Based on the behavioral theory,innovation orientation is divided into resource -oriented innovation and problem-oriented innovation.In other words,firms make an R＆D investment based on the objective of performance improving or slack utilization.In combination with behavioral theory and agency theory,we examine a sample of Chinese publicly -tra-ded manufacturing firms over the period of 2009 -2012 and argue the interaction effect between innovation orientation and managerial incentives on R＆D investment.We also examine the possible nonlinear relationship between managerial incen-tives and R＆D.We find that there is a substitution effect between executive short -term incentives and innovation orienta-tion on R＆D investment,and the stock ownership and the problem orientation have a significant positive effect on R＆D in-vestment.

关 键 词：研发投资 创新导向 短期薪酬激励 长期股权激励 

分 类 号：F424.3[经济管理—产业经济]