监管政策、高管激励与公司现金股利政策  

Regulatory Arrangement Executive Incentive and Cash Dividend Policy

作　　者：杨俊[1] 陈金勇[2] 孙建波[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院,湖北武汉430074 [2]湖北大学商学院,湖北武汉430062

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2015年第4期34-41,共8页Securities Market Herald

摘　　要：监管政策的调整影响公司的现金股利政策,而公司管理层激励影响公司决策行为。本文实证检验我国系列半强制分红政策出台后,公司管理层激励与现金股利政策之间的协同效应是否对政策调整做出反应,及对公司价值产生的影响。研究发现,货币性管理层激励与现金股利政策对企业价值的协同效应,在实质监管后确实有明显的增加,不过无论国有或非国有公司,这一效应并不是非常明显。研究为监管部门进一步理顺和完善我国上市公司分红机制提供了理论依据和经验证据。Adjustments of regulatory policy affect the company＇s cash dividend policy and the incentive of company＇s management influence the corporate decision-making behavior. In this paper, we empirically investigate whether the synergy effect between incentive of company＇s management and cash dividend policy response to semi-mandatory dividend policy in China, and the resulting impact on the value of companies. We find that, the synergy effect does have a significant increase, but whether stateowned or non-state-owned companies, this effect is not very obvious. Our result provides a theoretical basis and empirical evidence for regulatory authorities to further rationalize and improve the mechanism of dividends of listed companies.

关 键 词：监管政策 高管激励 现金股利 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]