药品价格规制中的政府间博弈分析  

A Game Analysis of the Regulation of Drug Prices between Local Government and Central Government

作　　者：聂思痕 洪黎明[2] 龙新[3] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学产业经济研究院,南昌330013 [2]南昌大学建筑工程学院,南昌330000 [3]江西外语外贸职业学院国际商务系,南昌330000

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第4期35-42,共8页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金地区科学基金项目;项目编号:71363020;江西省研究生创新专项基金项目;项目编号:YC2013-B052;江西财经大学研究生创新项目"战略性新兴产业人力资本安全预警研究"资助

摘　　要：以药品最高零售限价为主的药品价格规制机制失灵的根本原因应该从规制的源头即政府的作为找起。本文通过建立反映中央政府与地方政府在药品价格规制机制中作用的委托-代理模型对其行为进行分析,发现药品价格规制机制在当前考核体系下会对地方政府形成扭曲激励,地方政府因而会罔顾社会总福利的损失,消极应对中央政府的政令;当前中央政府与地方政府的财力分配格局,使得激励的扭曲效应在短期内无法消除。因此,中央政府应尽快放开药品价格管制、放弃药品价格最高零售限价政策,从改革政绩考核模式入手,并通过地方政府财政给付抵消现有机制内在的激励扭曲,让改革的成果真正惠及黎民百姓。The fundamental reason for failure of pharmaceuticals price regulation mechanism based on a maximum retail price drug should be found beginning from regulation,that is action of government. By building a principal- agent model reflecting the effects of central government and local government in the mechanism of pharmaceuticals price regulation,this paper analyzes its behavior,finding the mechanism of pharmaceuticals price regulation will form distort incentives for local governments in the current system,and local government will disregard social welfare losses and negatively cope with the writ of the central government; the central government and local government＇s financial allocation pattern makes it impossible to eliminate the distort effects in the short- term incentive. Therefore,the central government should relax drug price control as soon as possible,give up the maximum retail price policy,and start from the reform of the performance evaluation model,in order to actually benefit common people,by giving financial payment to local government to offset existing intrinsic incentive twist.

关 键 词：药品价格 规制失灵 地方政府 委托-代理模型 政绩考核 

分 类 号：F726.6[经济管理—产业经济]