制度变迁三元主体合作博弈问题研究  

Study of Cooperating Games of Three Main Bodies in Institutional Evolvement

作　　者：李怀[1] 时晓虹[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学经济与社会发展研究院,产业组织与企业组织研究中心,辽宁大连116025 [2]大连商品交易所博士后科研工作站,辽宁大连116023

出　　处：《天津商业大学学报》2015年第2期3-19,共17页Journal of Tianjin University of Commerce

基　　金：2010年教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地项目(2010CIB03)

摘　　要：制度变迁离不开相应行为主体的推动,从行政等级角度上可以将这些主体划分为中央政府、地方政府及微观个体三元主体,他们之间既有利益冲突也有共同利益,不同关系会对制度变迁的效果产生差异化的影响。本文从多阶段重复博弈的角度探讨三元主体建立合作博弈的可能性及必要性,摒弃非合作博弈视角下三者之间此消彼长的利益冲突分析模式,建立三者共同收益最大化的目标,谋求使三者利益都扩大的新型利益关系模式,并通过合作博弈模型分别分析单阶段合作博弈和多阶段合作博弈实现卡尔多-希克斯效率的条件,从而为我们在制度变迁决策过程中三元主体之间的关系协调提供理论依据。我国汽车产业入世后迅速发展壮大的案例也证明了合作博弈有利于增加三元主体的目标收益并进一步使关系得到巩固。Institutional evolvement needs the push of main bodies, which can be divided into central government, local government and unit from the perspective of administrative level. There are both conflicts of interests and common interests among three main bodies, and different relations will have diverse effects on institutional evolvement. This article discusses the probability and necessity of cooperating games among three main bodies from the perspective of multistage repeated games, and abandons analytical mode of conflicts of interests from the perspective of non-cooperating games. It sets the goal of the maximization of common interests of three main bodies, studies a new relation which can enlarge their interests, and uses model to analyze both single stage and multistage cooperating games and the requirement of Karldor- Hicks Principle, which contributes to laying a theoretical foundation for how to coordinate the relation among three main bodies in the decision-making process of institutional evolvement. The case of rapid development of automobile industry after China＇ s entry into the WTO has also proved that cooperating games are good for both the improvement of interests and the consolidation of relation of three main bodies.

关 键 词：制度变迁 三元主体 合作博弈 重复博弈 

分 类 号：F019.8[经济管理—政治经济学]