基于第三方监督的食品安全监管演化博弈模型  

Evolutionary game model of food safety supervision based on the third-party intendance

作　　者：张国兴[1] 高晚霞[1] 管欣[1] 

机构地区：[1]兰州大学管理学院,甘肃兰州730000

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2015年第2期153-164,共12页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71103077);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划资助项目(NCET-13-0267);中国博士后科学基金第六批特别资助项目(2013T60880);兰州大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(14LZUWZD003)

摘　　要：为探讨第三方监督对食品安全监管的影响,通过构建演化博弈模型分析了第三方监督对食品企业与政府监管部门行为的影响机理.研究表明,第三方监督对于政府监管部门的监督作用具有一定程度上的替代性,强化第三方监督有助于促使政府监管部门加强监管以及改善企业食品安全治理;食品安全监管中存在"激励悖论"现象,相比单纯强调加大对食品安全事件中对企业处罚的力度,加强对政府监管部门及其人员本身监管不力等行为的惩罚,对于提高食品安全有着重要的实践意义.最后结合三鹿奶粉案例,阐述了第三方监督在食品安全监管中对演化博弈结果的重要影响.In order to study the influence on food safety supervision by third-party intendance, this paper es- tablishes an evolutionary game model and analyzes the mechanism where third party supervision influenced the behavior of food enterprises and government supervision departments. It is found that to some extent the third-party intendance can replace the supervisory role of government supervision departments. Reinforcing the third party supervision can make government supervision departments strengthen there supervision and improve the governance of food safety. Because of the existence of＂ incentive paradox＂ phenomenon in super- vision, it has an important practical significance on improving food quality by strengthening the punishment for government departments and staff for there laze and neglect rather than strengthening the punishment for enterprise. Finally, this paper analyzes the effect on the evolutionary game of food safety supervision that is caused by the third-party intendance through combining the case of Sanlu milk incident.

关 键 词：食品监管 第三方监督 演化博弈 激励悖论 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]