项目清算价值对风险投资决策行为的影响效应  

Influence of project liquidation value exert on decision making behavior of venture capital

作　　者：郭菊娥[1] 王智鑫[1] 郭广涛 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049 [2]西安银行股份有限公司,陕西西安710075

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2015年第2期174-180,共7页Journal of Systems Engineering

摘　　要：风险投资机构为了科学安排、优化项目契约,规避收益风险,将估值调整协议引入投资契约激励创业企业家提升努力水平,项目业绩如果未达协议目标则会根据项目属性进行清算.本文基于多阶段投资委托代理模型,引入清算价值系数区分不同投资项目清算价值差异,研究估值调整协议下清算价值对风投机构追加投资决策以及激励创业企业家效能的影响,并通过模型求解给出双方最大化的收益分配比例.结果表明,风投机构首期投资额与追加投资阈值随清算价值系数正向变动;风投机构首期投资额及其权益比例都与追加投资的触发阈值反向变动,但与创业企业获得追加投资的概率正相关.For scientific arrangement and optimization of the contract, risk investment institutions, this paper uses the valuation adjustment mechanism to motivate the entrepreneur to improve their efforts. If the project can not reach the goal, it will be liquidated. Based on the multi-stage investment principal-agent model, this paper uses the liquidation value coefficient differences to distinguish the risk of different investment projects, and tries to find the effect of liquidation value for multi-stage investment. In addition, this paper calculates the distributions of revenues in different stages, to maximize the benefits. The results show that during the first phase of the investment the liquidation value coefficient increases with the trigger threshold of additional investments. The initial investment and its rights decrease with the trigger threshold, but increase with the probability of additional investment.

关 键 词：清算价值 估值调整协议 风险投资 多阶段投资 追加投资阈值 

分 类 号：F830.593[经济管理—金融学]