基于前景理论的商业银行风险承担实证研究  

A Study on the Commercial Banks' Risk Taking based on the Perspective Theory

作　　者：刘青云[1] 杨有振[2] 

机构地区：[1]山西财经大学国际贸易学院,太原030006 [2]山西财经大学财政金融学院,太原030006

出　　处：《商业研究》2015年第5期93-99,共7页Commercial Research

基　　金：山西省研究生(博士)优秀创新项目资助

摘　　要：本文基于前景理论,以我国97家商业银行2003-2013年数据为样本,实证检验商业银行是否满足前景理论的假设条件。结果表明:由于我国商业银行尚不能完全实现"自主经营、自担风险、自负盈亏、自我约束",与国外银行相比,收益不能完全成为抑制我国商业银行风险承担的工具。因此,我国高收益商业银行不能表现出风险承担的自我抑制,而是同低收益商业银行一样,保持较高的风险承担动机。这表明我国商业银行依靠内部控制进行风险承担约束的机制尚未形成,必须依靠外部监管对商业银行风险承担行为进行校正,以实现金融安全和金融稳定的目标。Based on perspective theory, this paper tests whether the banks risk is consistent of the perspective theory or not by the samples of 97 commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2013. The results show because the commercial banks cannot fully realize the ＂self - management, self - risk, self - financing, self - restraint＂ , revenue cannot fully become an effective tool to inhibit commercial bank risk - taking, especially compared with foreign banks. Therefore, our high - yield commercial banks cannot exhibite the self - restraint of risk, but keep high risk motivations just as the low - yields commercial banks. This shows the mechanism about internal risk control of commercial banks in China has not yet been established, we must rely on the external financial regulation to achieve the objective of financial security and stability.

关 键 词：银行风险承担 前景理论 金融监管 

分 类 号：F830.33[经济管理—金融学]