分税制下地区经济结构与地方政府预算外收入行为分析——基于全国省级面板数据的实证研究  

Analysis of the Relationship Between Economic Structure and Local Governments' Behavior in the Tax-sharing System——an Empirical Analysis Based on Provincial Panel Data in China

作　　者：赵理想[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行营业管理部,北京100036

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2015年第2期74-77,121,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

摘　　要：分税制后,财权与事权的不对称导致地方政府预算外收入急剧膨胀,预算外收入的膨胀是对地区经济实施攫取的行为,但由于各地经济结构和预算内支出压力不同,地方政府的攫取行为也会呈现区域性差异。将地方政府预算外收入膨胀量化为攫取之手指数,并运用1995年—2010年的省级面板数据,深入探讨影响地方预算外收入的因素。结果表明,非农产业和非国有制经济越发达,地方政府对经济的攫取程度越小,预算内支出压力越大,攫取行为越强。After tax-sharing reform,the asymmetry of governance and property rights lead to the off-budget income of Chinese local government has increased rapidly,the expansion of off-budget income is a grasping behavior on regional economic,but the grasping behavior will show regional disparities due to different economic structure and expenditure pressure. The paper quantitates local government behavior,discuss the factors that affect local government behavior by using provincial panel data from1995 to 2010. Regression result shows that there is a strong negative correlation between the grasping behavior and the development of non-agricultural industry and non-state economy,but there is positive correlation between grasping behavior and expenditure pressure.

关 键 词：预算外收入 经济结构 攫取行为 区域性差异 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]