面对异质竞买者风投退出困境与量子博弈均衡  

Venture capital exit dilemma and quantum equilibrium in presence of heterogeneous bidders

作　　者：郑君君[1] 张平[1] 蒋伟良[1] 饶从军[2] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]华中科技大学系统工程研究所,武汉430074

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2015年第4期62-72,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371147;71071120)

摘　　要：风险投资市场中风险投资家与风险企业家对异质外部投资者的选择可能因存在分歧而形成退出困境,鉴于此,运用量子博弈对两者的策略选择与纠缠度进行分析,研究结果表明在量子博弈中存在着一个临界条件,当两者选择相同策略的纠缠度从0逐渐增大时,纳什均衡解将发生根本变化;控制两者选择相同策略的纠缠度大于选择不同策略的纠缠度是实现风险投资顺利退出的条件,而具体的均衡解则取决于初始密度矩阵中不同策略纠缠度的取值.The strategies of venture capitalist and entrepreneurs in the venture capital market may form an exit dilemma,therefore,the analysis of their strategy selection and entanglement using quantum game is given. The results show that there is a critical condition,and that the Nash equilibrium of the quantum game will be completely different when the entanglement that the two party setect the same strategy varies. The condition of a successful exit is that the entanglement that they two select the same strategy is greater than that they select different strategies,and the specific equilibrium depends on the entanglement in the initial quantum state.

关 键 词：风险投资退出 策略选择 量子博弈 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：F224.13[经济管理—国民经济]