基于博弈分析视角的制造业与物流业动态联动信任研究  

Based the Game Theory Analysis to Study on the Trust in the Dynamic Interactive Development of the Manufacturing Industry and Logistics Industry

作　　者：李正锋[1] 朱亚萍[2] 

机构地区：[1]盐城工学院管理学院,江苏盐城224051 [2]盐城工学院基础教学部,江苏盐城224051

出　　处：《物流工程与管理》2015年第3期25-27,12,共4页Logistics Engineering and Management

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高等学校哲学社会科学基金项目(2013SJB6300100);全国统计科学研究计划项目(2013LY060)

摘　　要：基于博弈分析视角对制造业与物流业动态联动中双方的信任合作进行研究。首先从一次性博弈进行分析,发现制造业与物流业的选择结果是"不信任"的帕累托低效均衡解;其次从无限次重复博弈进行分析,结果显示制造业与物流业双方都摆脱了一次性博弈困境,选择结果是"信任"的帕累托最优均衡解;最后引入政府的介入,发现会显著影响制造业与物流业联动信任的策略选择结果。研究认为应该从制造业与物流业加大行业自律、政府加大介入程度等方面完善两业动态联动信任机制。Based on the game,the paper studies the trust and dynamic cooperation of both sides of manufacturing industry and logistics industry.By using the one -off game model,we find both the manufacturing industry and logistics industry will choose the Pareto inefficient equilibrium solution,which means “to distrust”each other.By using the infinitely repeated game model,they will get out of the dilemma posed by one -off game,and choose the Pareto optimal equilibrium solution,which means“to trust”each other,with the government＇s involvement,the alliance members will be greatly influenced on their strategies in the game.The research thinks that should from the manufacturing and logistics industry increase the perfect dynamic trust mechanism of self -discipline,increased government intervention degree etc.

关 键 词：制造业与物流业 动态联动 信任机制 博弈 

分 类 号：F250[经济管理—国民经济]