Bayesian mechanism for rational secret sharing scheme  

作　　者：TIAN YouLiang PENG ChangGen LIN DongDai MA JianFeng JIANG Qi JI WenJiang 

机构地区：[1]State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering,Chinese Academy of Sciences [2]College of Science, Guizhou University [3]School of Computer Science and Technology, Xidian University

出　　处：《Science China(Information Sciences)》2015年第5期117-129,共13页中国科学（信息科学）（英文版）

基　　金：supported by Program for Changjiang Scholars and Innovative Research Team in University(Grant No.IRT1078);Key Program of NSFC-Guangdong Union Foundation(Grant No.U1135002);Major National S&T Program(Grant No.2011ZX03005-002);National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61170280,61272398,61262073,61363068);China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(Grant No.2013M530705);Natural Science Foundation of Guizhou of China(Grant No.20132112);Doctor Foundation of the Guizhou University(Grant No.2012-024);Strategic Priority Research Program of the Chinese Academy of Sciences(Grant No.XDA06010701)

摘　　要：We consider the cooperation of rational parties in secret sharing. We present a new methodology for rational secret sharing both in two-party and multi-party settings based on Bayesian game. Our approach can resolve the impossible solutions to a rational secret sharing model. First, we analyze the 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing using Bayesian game, which makes us able to consider different classes of the protocol player （for ＂good＂ and ＂bad＂ players） and model attributes such as any other parties＇ preferences and beliefs that may affect the outcome of the game. Thus, the new model makes us able to reason rational secret sharing from the perspective of Bayesian rationality, a notion that may be in some scenarios more appropriate than that defined as per pure rational. According to these analyses, we propose a Bayesian rational protocol of 2-out-of-2 secret sharing. Also, our techniques can be extended to the case of t-out-of-n Bayesian rational secret sharing easily. Our protocol is adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to beliefs and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels and can be run over asynchronous networks.We consider the cooperation of rational parties in secret sharing. We present a new methodology for rational secret sharing both in two-party and multi-party settings based on Bayesian game. Our approach can resolve the impossible solutions to a rational secret sharing model. First, we analyze the 2-out-of-2 rational secret sharing using Bayesian game, which makes us able to consider different classes of the protocol player （for ＂good＂ and ＂bad＂ players） and model attributes such as any other parties＇ preferences and beliefs that may affect the outcome of the game. Thus, the new model makes us able to reason rational secret sharing from the perspective of Bayesian rationality, a notion that may be in some scenarios more appropriate than that defined as per pure rational. According to these analyses, we propose a Bayesian rational protocol of 2-out-of-2 secret sharing. Also, our techniques can be extended to the case of t-out-of-n Bayesian rational secret sharing easily. Our protocol is adopted only by the parties in their decision-making according to beliefs and Bayes rule, without requiring simultaneous channels and can be run over asynchronous networks.

关 键 词：rational secret sharing game theory Bayesian game perfect Bayesian equilibrium Bayesian ra-tionality 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论]