创新药的政府定价与研发支出的均衡  

The Equilibrium between Regulated Prices and R&D Expenditure on New Drugs

作　　者：曹剑涛[1] 马进[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海商学院,中国上海200235 [2]上海交通大学公共卫生学院,中国上海200025

出　　处：《上海商学院学报》2015年第1期42-51,共10页Business Economic Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71273175);上海市公共卫生重点学科建设项目(12GWZX0601)--询证卫生经济学

摘　　要：国内创新药高差价率政策诱发药价虚高,却没有带来研发能力的增强。针对这一现状,本文构建政府处于主导地位的博弈模型,分别讨论"政府单独考虑患者总效用"和"政府同时兼顾患者效用以及药企利润"两种情形,并证明了两种情形下创新药政府定价和研发支出均衡的存在。理论分析结果表明,政府对创新药价格规制策略是有效的,不仅保障患者的效用,而且保证药企的合理研发支出水平。更为重要的是,政府兼顾患者效用和药企利润,以社会福利最大化的目标对新药进行定价,实现价格管制策略和研发投入策略的均衡,更具有积极的现实意义。因为对价格弹性较小的新药制定较高的价格,以及对价格弹性过大的新药制定较低的价格,都有助于研发支出的增加。Considering the fact that sole pricing policy on new drugs has not led to increasing R^D expenditure in pharmaceutical industry with generic drugs＇virtual-high prices, we attempt to solve it from the game theory perspective and price regulation. We build 2 - stage game models with the government as a leader and the pharmaceutical manufacturer as a follower, discuss respectively two situations, in one of which the government considers only patients utility and in the other of which the government considers both patients utility and the manufacturer＇s profit, and prove that Nash equilibriums exist in the two situations. The theoretical analysis shows that the government＇s pricing strategies are scientific and efficient for guaranteeing patients utility optimally and promoting Rg〉D investment level feasibly. Furthermore, it is of more positive significance that the government, aiming at optimizing the social welfare, has an equal attitude toward patient utility and the pharmaceutical firm＇profit. This is because the increase of R＆D expenditures result from whether higher price is determined on new drugs with lower price elasticity or lower price determined on the ones with extremely higher elasticity.

关 键 词：创新药 研发 政府定价 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：R95[医药卫生—药学] F426.72[经济管理—产业经济] F273.1