房地产经纪机构诚信缺失:经纪机构与消费者的博弈分析  

The Real Brokerage Agency's Lack of Honesty:Game Playing Analysis of Brokerage Agency and Consumer

作　　者：安春晓[1] 付光辉[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学土木工程学院,南京211816

出　　处：《价值工程》2015年第15期257-258,F0003,共3页Value Engineering

基　　金：房地产经纪人服务体系规范化建设监管研究;2013年度省建设系统科技项目(JH24)

摘　　要：房地产经纪机构失信行为损害了交易双方的利益,造成了市场资源的浪费。房地产经纪机构诚信缺失的原因除了房地产经纪机构自身的问题,更重要的是外部监督的失效。在房地产经纪机构与消费者之间有无外部监督的情况下,通过构造博弈模型,得出如下结论:有效的内、外部监督是解决当前房地产经纪机构诚信问题的关键。Real brokerage agency＇s dishonesty harms the interests of both parties, and it results the waste of market resources. In addition to the real brokerage agency itself, the more important reason of real brokerage agency＇s dishonesty is the failure of external supervision. In case of the real brokerage agencies and consumers being supervised externally or not, by constructing game model, it concludes following： effective internal and external supervision is the key to solve the problem of the current real estate brokerage agency integrity.

关 键 词：房地产经纪机构 诚信 博弈 监督 

分 类 号：F293.33[经济管理—国民经济]