流动人口参与基层政府民主监督问题探讨  

Research on Issues Concerning Participation by Migrant Population in Democratic Supervision for Grass-roots Government

作　　者：戴长征[1] 余艳红[1] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际关系学院,北京100029

出　　处：《江苏行政学院学报》2015年第3期78-83,共6页The Journal of Jiangsu Administration Institute

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"我国流动人口政治参与问题研究"(08BZZ006);北京市共建项目"影响首都社会稳定的主要风险及防范对策研究"(47140704)的资助

摘　　要：占我国人口数量17%以上的流动人口群体参与基层政府的民主监督,是保障该群体合法权益、扩大公民有序政治参与的重要问题。在流动人口所采用的司法诉讼和上访活动这两种监督形式中,形成了该群体与基层政府之间的"共生博弈"关系,表现出政治监督上的"被动反应"特点,反映的是流动人口对基层政府进行民主监督的困境。造成困境的原因在于流动人口参与基层政府民主监督渠道的限制、积极性的缺乏和收益风险上的考量。转变基层政府思想观念、进行制度性监督渠道的建设、提升流动人口抗风险能力,以及政府体制内监督机制的强化,是突破困境、改善流动人口参与基层政府民主监督现状的重要选择。The participation by migrant population, who represent 17% of China＇s total population, in democratic supervision for grass-roots government is an important issue for the protection of the legitimate rights and interests of this group of people and the expansion of citizens＇ orderly political participation. In the two forms of supervision by migrant population, namely judicial proceedings and petition activities, we can find the ＂symbiotic game＂ relationship between this group of people and local government, showing the feature of ＂passive reaction＂ in political oversight, and reflecting the difficulty for the migrant population to exercise democratic supervision for grass-roots government. The causes for such difficulties lie with the limitations of channels for migrant population to participate in democratic supervision of grass-roots government, lack of enthusiasm, and considerations of risks and benefits. Changing grass-roots government＇s concepts and ideas, building channels for institutional supervision, improving the risk-resisting ability of migrant population, and strengthening oversight mechanisms within the system of government, these are important solutions for improving the status quo of migrant population＇s participation in democratic supervision of grass-roots government.

关 键 词：流动人口 基层政府 民主监督 

分 类 号：F426[经济管理—产业经济]