出资社员与非出资社员按惠顾返利博弈分析——以林业专业合作社为例  

Game analysis of rebates by patronage proportion from investing and non-investing members——Taking forestry professional cooperatives as a case

作　　者：陈建敏[1] 黄森慰[2] 谢志忠[3] 张春霞[3] 

机构地区：[1]福建农林大学文法学院 [2]福建农林大学可持续发展研究所 [3]福建农林大学经济学院,福建福州350002

出　　处：《福建农林大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第2期59-62,共4页Journal of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71173039);福建省科技厅软科学项目(2013R0019)

摘　　要：通过建立博弈模型,分析林业专业合作社出资社员与非出资社员按惠顾返利的博弈行为,结果表明社员均选择自身惠顾额比例或出资额比例较高的作为盈余分配标准,以增进自身利益,博弈均衡的条件是社员自身的惠顾额比例等于出资额比例。分析提出应尽量减少社员自身的出资和惠顾差异,将交易优惠额、出资利息列入会计账目等建议,以促进合作社按惠顾返利。A game model has been established to analyze the distribution by patronage proportion between investment and non-in- vestment members in forestry professional cooperative, which has proved that members always select the higher numbers between investment proportion and patronage proportion of themselves to distribute surplus profits to get more interests, and the game equilibri- um condition is the investment proportion equal to the patronage proportion of members. Accordingly some policies and legal advices are proposed to promote distribution by patronage proportion in cooperative profits, such as minimize the differences between member＇s investment proportion and patronage proportion, and put member＇s investment interests in cooperative operating costs.

关 键 词：林业专业合作社 出资社员 非出资社员 按惠顾返利 博弈分析 

分 类 号：F316.23[经济管理—产业经济]