骨干边缘分离网络联盟博弈入流量规划  

Coalition Games Based Incoming Traffic Engineering Used in Transit-Edge Separated Internet

作　　者：张耀东[1] 王钺[1] 姜春晓[1] 裴丹[2] 袁坚[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学电子工程系,北京100084 [2]清华大学计算机系,北京100084

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报》2015年第1期40-45,共6页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：国家重点基础研究发展计划(973计划)项目(2013CB329105);国家自然科学基金项目(61273214)

摘　　要：针对骨干边缘分离网络下自私性对边缘自治域入流量规划的影响,提出了基于联盟博弈的入流量规划模型.该模型以网络开销作为入流量规划性能的评价指标,建立了网络开销与网络运营商收益的关系.边缘自治域通过与其他自治域形成联盟,优化其入流量规划性能,提高其网络运营商的收益.同时,分析了联盟核心的特点,并提出基于SHAPLEY值的收益分配方法.仿真结果表明,基于联盟博弈的入流量规划方法能提高边缘自治域的入流量规划性能,基于SHAPLEY值的收益分配方法实现了加入联盟核心的边缘自治域收益的公平分配.边缘自治域能否组成联盟受到运营商收益与入流量规划性能关系的影响.The impact of selfishness on edge autonomous systems under transit-edge separated Internet was analyzed,and an incoming traffic engineering model based on coalition games was proposed. This model uses network cost as evaluation metrics for incoming traffic engineering performance and establishes relationship as well between network cost and revenues of Internet service provider when this edge autonomous systems（ AS） is operating. The coalition achieves maximum revenues by decreasing network cost of the edge AS. Furthermore,the characteristic of coalition was illustrated,followed by the revenue allocation method based on SHAPLEY value. Simulation shows that the incoming traffic engineering based on coalition games can decrease network cost of edge ASes,and the revenue allocation method based on SHAPLEY value is fair to edge ASes joining the core of the coalition. Besides,it is shown that the relationship between revenues and network cost affects the result whether edge ASes can form a coalition.

关 键 词：入流量规划 骨干边缘分离网络 联盟博弈 

分 类 号：TN929.53[电子电信—通信与信息系统]