非合作条件下基于责任延伸制的电子废弃物回收主体利益博弈研究  

WEEE recovery subject interest game research based on extended producer responsibility of non-cooperation condition

作　　者：林文[1] 高阳[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南大学,长沙410083

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2015年第6期1689-1693,共5页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071163)

摘　　要：针对由两个制造商、两个回收商、当地政府和消费者构成的物流系统,研究了非合作条件下电子废弃物回收主体的利益博弈。在责任延伸制前提下,以回收商为斯坦伯格主导者,分别构建了非合作条件下的垄断回收模型和竞争回收模型,并采用逆推法求解了模型的纳什均衡条件。最后进行灵敏度分析,探讨了产品替代率和回收率对两种模式下产品销售价格和回收费用的影响。结果表明,对于回收商,垄断回收模式下的平均回收费用总比竞争回收模式高,且回收商需根据临界值选择回收模式;对于制造商,垄断回收模式下设定的价格总比竞争回收模式高,且制造商总是偏好竞争回收模式。研究结果可为决策者对回收模式的选择提供理论依据。Directed at the logistics system consisting of two manufacturers, two recyclers,local government and consumers,this paper studied WEEE recovery subject interest game under the Condition of non-cooperation. When recycler as Steinberg leader, it constructed the monopoly recycling model and competition recycling model respectively under the precondition of EPR, and used backward method to solve the Nash equilibrium conditions. Finally it made use of sensitivity analysis, probed the influ- ence of product replacement rate and recovery rate on the price and cost of recycling for two models. The results show that, for recyclers, the average recovery cost is high under monopoly model when compared with competition, and there have a critical value for recyclers to choose recovery model; and for manufacturers, the price is high under monopoly model when compared with competition model, and manufacturers always prefer competition recovery model. The research provides policy makers theoretical basis to choose recovery model.

关 键 词：责任延伸制 废弃电子电器产品 斯坦伯格博弈 回收模式 

分 类 号：F252.81[经济管理—国民经济]