轻量级分组密码TWINE的差分故障攻击  

Differential fault attack on TWINE

作　　者：徐朋[1] 魏悦川[1] 潘晓中[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民武装警察部队工程大学电子技术系,西安710086

出　　处：《计算机应用研究》2015年第6期1796-1800,共5页Application Research of Computers

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目

摘　　要：为了对轻量级分组密码TWINE的安全性进行研究,分析了轻量级分组密码TWINE的抗差分故障攻击特性,给出了TWINE一种差分故障分析方法,采用面向半字节的随机故障模型对TWINE算法进行攻击。实验结果表明,在35轮注入4次故障后可将密钥空间降低至约220,平均注入13.15次故障后可完全恢复80 bit密钥,最好的情况为注入12次故障完全恢复种子密钥。因此得到结论:TWINE算法易受差分故障攻击,需在使用前对设备加以保护。This paper analyzed the resistance of TWINE against differential fault attack in order to do research on the security of TWINE. It presented a method of differential fault analysis on TWINE and applied the nibble-based random fault model to attack TWINE. As a result, the key space can be limited to 220 after 4 injections of fault into round 35. The 80 bit primitive key can be determined after 13. 15 injections of fault on average. The best result is that it determines the 80 bit primitive key by in- jecting 12 faults. So TWINE is vulnerable to differential fault attack and advanced protection should be used before applying this kind of device.

关 键 词：轻量级分组密码 安全性 TWINE 差分故障攻击 随机故障模型 

分 类 号：TP309.2[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]