企业创新与高管薪酬-业绩敏感性——基于国有上市公司的经验研究  

Firm Innovation and Executive Pay-performance Sensitivity——Empirical Evidence from SOEs in China

作　　者：江伟[1,2] 姚文韬[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学管理学院,广东广州510632 [2]暨南大学管理会计研究中心,广东广州510632

出　　处：《经济管理》2015年第5期63-73,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"中国企业管理会计理论与方法研究"(71032006);国家自然科学基金面上项目"基于成本黏性视角的企业成本管理行为研究"(71272212);广东省普通高校人文社科重点研究基地暨南大学企业发展研究所重大项目"企业转型中的战略成本管理研究"(2014ZD001)

摘　　要：本文以企业专利的申请量作为其创新活动的代理变量,实证检验了企业创新对于国有上市公司高管薪酬—业绩敏感性的影响。本文的研究结果表明,在创新越多的国有上市公司中,高管薪酬与公司业绩之间的敏感性有所减弱,但是,这一关系只存在于国有高新技术公司中,在国有非高新技术公司这一关系不存在;进一步的研究发现,与中央控股高新技术公司相比,在地方国有高新技术公司中,公司创新和高管薪酬与公司业绩敏感性之间的负相关关系有所增强。本文的研究意义不仅在于丰富和拓展了国内外关于企业创新与高管薪酬激励之间关系的研究文献,而且对于设计高管人员创新活动的薪酬契约具有一定的实践启示作用。Innovation is vital to cultivate core competence,and thus a key source of sustainable growth for firms.Top managers,who make strategic decisions,play a significant role in positioning and motivating firm innovation.Therefore,it is a hot topic to motivate managerial innovation in both the academic and the practice field（Manso,2011;Ederer Manso,2013）.Most prior studies on managerial incentive focus on how to motivate managers in routine decisions（Jensen Murphy,1990;Ke,Rui Yu,2012）.To mitigate agency problem involved in managerial routine decisions,the theory of optimal compensation contract argues that standard pay-for-performance schemes should be used to induce effort or avoid tunneling（Jensen and Murphy,1990）.However,Manso（2011） points out that,innovation involves the exploration of new untested approaches that are likely to fail,therefore,standard payfor-performance schemes that punish failures with low rewards and termination may have adverse effects on innovation.The experimental evidence from Ederer Manso（2013） supports the argument of Manso（2011）.Therefore,how should managerial compensation be structured to induce managers to pursue innovation？ Or how does innovation affect standard pay-for-performance schemes？ These questions are under-studied.In this paper,we use the number of applied patents to proxy for firm innovation,and examines the effect of firm innovation on executive pay—performance sensitivity in Chinese SOEs.The results show that,the more firm innovation,the weaker the executive pay—performance sensitivity is,but this relation only exists in high-technology SOEs,and does not exist in non-high-technology SOEs.The reasons may be that,on the one hand,high-technology SOEs use weaker pay—performance sensitivity to motivate managerial innovation,and this incentive scheme exhibits substantial tolerance or even reward for early failure and reward for long-term success,since managers are likely to waste time with inferior actions during the exploration of new untested a

关 键 词：企业创新 薪酬—业绩敏感性 高新技术公司 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]