规则公平偏好对个体公共物品自愿供给的影响:一项实验研究  

Fair-Rule Preference and the Voluntary Provision in Public Goods:An Experimental Investigation

作　　者：关宏宇[1] 朱宪辰[1] 周彩霞[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京理工大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《财贸经济》2015年第5期35-47,共13页Finance & Trade Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学青年科学基金"公共品自愿供给中的社会偏好与惩罚机制研究"(71203145);教育部人文社科基金"关于资源支配规则偏好的实验研究"(11YJA790077);江苏省研究生科研创新计划项目(CXZZ13_0230)

摘　　要：经济学始终关注涉他偏好对公共物品自愿供给的影响,而对于关注过程的规则偏好的研究尚不多见。本文设计了一个带有否决权购买的独裁者实验,通过被试面临两种博弈规则的选择,度量其公平规则偏好。随后根据Fischbacher等的两阶段公共物品实验考察个体社会偏好类型。实验结果表明:(1)被试中约60%的个体持有较显著的公平规则偏好;(2)重复公共物品实验中,公平规则偏好强的个体平均投入水平高于公平规则偏好弱的个体;(3)公平规则偏好程度不同,投入水平受到社会偏好与信念的影响权重不同,行为调整模式有显著差别。The research of voluntary provision of public goods in last two decades has predominantly focused on the other-regarding social preference, but has not paid much attention to the rule preference regarding procedure. This paper reports the results of an experiment of a dictator game with option of buying veto to change the rule to a relatively more equitable ultimatum game, and a two-stage public goods game. This paper measures the preference for the two rules by ranking how much they pay for the veto, and identifies different types of cooperative preference and tests their effects on the public goods provision. The results indicate that individuals care about the rule and procedure, which is explained by the rule preference. And the results also show that individuals with different rule preferences for equitable have different beliefs and behavior patterns.

关 键 词：规则偏好 社会偏好 公共物品自愿供给 实验 

分 类 号：F062.6[经济管理—政治经济学]