机制的形而上学意蕴  

Metaphysical Notion of Mechanism

作　　者：庄媛[1,2] 徐竹[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学院大学人文学院,北京100049 [2]中国科学院心理研究所,北京100101

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2015年第5期26-30,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"当代科学哲学中的因果理论前沿研究"(12CZX016)和"科学实践哲学与地方性知识研究"(13&ZD068)

摘　　要：介入主义与机制理论是当代两大主要的因果理论。MRL观点和ADT观点是自然律理论的两大阵营。在因果性和自然律理论上呈现的是围绕着休谟主义传统的争论。"新休谟主义"反对在因果与非因果、自然律与经验规律之间设置截然的区分。但基于神经科学实践的要求,"机制"概念不能不担负起诉诸实在本身的形而上学意蕴。Interventionism and mechanism theory are two main views in contemporary debate of causation. While in the theory of laws of nature, blill- Ramsey-Lewis and Armstrong-Dretske- Tooley points take dominated positions. The substantial debate in theories of both laws of nature and causa- tion focuses mainly on Humeanism. Neo-Humeanism denies any intrinsic distinction between causal and non-causal, laws of nature and empirical regularities. However, according to some requirements from practices Of neuroscience, it is unavoidable for the notion of mechanism to put forward metaphysical implications.

关 键 词：机制 因果性 自然律 科学实践 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]