基于演化博弈的创业投资辛迪加网络生成机制研究  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Formation Mechanism of Venture Capital Syndicate Network

作　　者：孔令涛[1] 侯合银[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2015年第9期207-211,共5页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金项目"创业投资辛迪加网络的治理机制研究"(09SJD630001);南京市哲学社会科学规划项目"文化产业园的绩效评估体系研究"(12Y07)

摘　　要：在创业投资行业,创业投资机构通过联合投资以规避风险和增加收益,进而形成创业投资辛迪加网络。运用演化博弈理论和方法,通过引入创业企业质量变量,研究其对不同类型创业投资家群体的策略选择及互动机制的影响,探讨了创业投资家的类型和创业企业的质量对辛迪加网络生成的影响。博弈结果表明:高声誉创业投资家不仅会与高声誉创业投资家进行联合,还有可能与低声誉创业投资家进行联合,最终趋于形成星型网络结构。The venture capital industry is characterized by the co -investment activities among the VCs to mitigate risks and increase revenues. The venture capital syndicate network is a byproduct of them. This paper tries to utilize the evolu- tionary game theory and method by introducing the quality of the start - ups, research the interaction mechanism of the strategy choice of differently types of group of venture capitalists who are bounded rational player, and discuss the effects of the types of VCs and the quality of the start - ups to the formation of syndicate network. The results shows that high reputa- tion venture capitalists will not only join venture capitalists with high reputation, and may be related to low reputation for joint venture investment; the VCs tend to form approximate star network architecture, which could provide suggestions for the VCs and other stakeholders.

关 键 词：创业投资 辛迪加网络 演化博弈 创业企业质量 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F279.2