理解“法律与道德”关系的“建构性诠释”视角  

“Constructive Interpretation”to Understand the Relationship Between“Law and Morality”

作　　者：徐晨[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学凯原法学院,上海200030

出　　处：《上海交通大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第3期67-75,共9页Journal of Shanghai Jiao tong University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：德沃金所提出的"建构性诠释"路数将怎样理解法律与道德之间的关系?针对法律实证主义者在这个问题上所坚持的"分离命题",德沃金认为此种"语义学之刺"以不必要的方式限制了法律语言的灵活性,而正确看待法律与道德关系的则应当是他所谓的"诠释性态度"。由此种态度衍生出的特定"法律概念"及其"概念延伸"与"道德"正因为其内容取决于彼此所以才成其为"不同"。而此种关联与差异又将提供一种新的模式,以便于更好地理解法理学关于"恶法亦(非)法"的经典难题以及处于不同文化和历史背景下的特定法律实践。How will the approach of ＂constructive interpretation＂ claimed by Ronald Dworkin understand the relation between law and morality？ Contrary to the legal positivism view presented as ＂Thesis of Separation＂, Dworkin argued that the ＂sting of semantic＂ has limited the flexibility of legal language in an unnecessary way and that the right attitude to examine the relation between law and morality is what he called an ＂interpretive＂ one. The ＂ legal concepts＂ and ＂legal conceptions＂ derived from this attitude are different from morality simply because their contents are dependent on each other. New model can be provided, if such differences and dependence seriously are taken, to achieve a better understanding of classical jurisprudence puzzle of ＂evil law is（not） law＂ and better interpretation to particular legal practice in different cultural and historical background.

关 键 词：建构性诠释 分离命题 概念和概念延伸 法律语言的灵活性 恶法亦(非)法 

分 类 号：D90-052[政治法律—法学理论]