政绩考核、交流效应与经济发展——兼论地方政府行为短期化  

Performance Appraisal,Exchange Effect and Economic Development——The Short-termism of Local Governments

作　　者：刘瑞明[1] 金田林 

机构地区：[1]西北大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710127

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2015年第3期9-18,124,共10页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71303185);国家社会科学基金项目(13CJL044);教育部社会科学基金项目(13XJA790003);陕西省社科基金项目(12D124);陕西省教育厅项目(12JK0152);西北大学优秀青年学术骨干支持计划项目(PR12152)

摘　　要：本文从政绩考核与官员异地交流视角重新审视中国的地方政府行为。研究发现,在中国式分权激励机制和以GDP增长为核心的政绩考核体制的背景下,激励机制的扭曲和考核体制的不完善诱发了地方官员行为的短期化倾向,而不规律的官员交流机制使得地方官员表现出更为强烈的"流寇"特征,其短期化偏好进一步被强化。本文通过对中国改革进程中突出的公共服务短缺、资源诅咒陷阱与环境治理不足这三类问题进行深入剖析,印证了前述有关地方政府行为短期化的认识。在此基础上,本文提供了一些可供借鉴的政策建议。This paper resurveys the behaviors of Chinese local governments from the perspective of performance appraisal and the exchange among the officials in different places. The research finds that under the background of the performance appraisal system that adopts Chinese split stimulation mechanism and takes GDP growth as the core,the distorted stimulation mechanism and imperfect examination system seduce the short-termism tendency of local officials and the irregular officials' exchange mechanism make the local officials have the stronger features of 'roving bandits'and their short-termism preference is strengthened further. This paper deeply analyses three kinds of problems in the process of Chinese reform including shortage of public services,resource anathema trap and environmental harnessing and verifies the above-mentioned recognition on the short-termism of local governments. Based on this,this paper provides some policy suggestions that can be learned from.

关 键 词：政绩考核 官员任期 官员交流 政府行为短期化 流寇效应 激励扭曲 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F124[政治法律—中外政治制度]