出行者出行方式选择行为的重复博弈分析  

Repeated Games Analysis of Trip Model Choice Behavior

作　　者：肖海燕[1] 度巍[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖北第二师范学院数学与统计学院,武汉430205 [2]南通大学交通学院,江苏南通226019

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2015年第2期24-28,35,共6页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：湖北省教育厅科学技术研究重点项目(D20143002)

摘　　要：利用博弈理论,建立了出行者出行方式选择行为的博弈模型,并将一次博弈模型扩展至重复博弈模型.通过分析得到出行者合作策略稳定运行的条件,即当博弈方都比较注重长远利益的情况下会选择合作策略.由于出行者在进行博弈时,可能会'犯错误',因此建立了具有颤抖效应的重复博弈模型,给出了博弈方在可能犯错情况下的收益,这种情况更符合实际,通过分析得到了在博弈方都比较注重长远利益的情况下均会采取触发策略.本文从理论上建立了有效地激励出行者选择公交车出行的决策机制、激励惩罚机制,并针对目前的公共交通现状给出了相应的对策与建议,以期为公共交通建设创新提供依据.The trip model choice behavior of the travelers is established by game theory, and it is extended from one time game to repeated games. The stable operation condition of the cooperation strategy is obtained, that is the players will cooperate with each other if they pay more attention to the long-term interests. Because the travelers would make mistakes, the shaking effect of repeated games model is established. And the revenue of players is given in this case which is more in line with the actual. Then it is proved that the players will take trigger strategy if they pay more attention to the long-term interests. In addition, effective decision-making mechanism and incentive-punishment mechanism are set up in order to encourage travelers to choose bus travel. At last, the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are given according to the present situation of public transport in order to provide the reference for public transportation construction innovation.

关 键 词：城市交通 出行方式 重复博弈 出行者 颤抖效应 

分 类 号：U491[交通运输工程—交通运输规划与管理]