基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究  

Selection of Highway Toll Channels Based on Evolutionary Game

作　　者：张弓亮[1] 张成科[2] 曹铭[1] 肖继辉 

机构地区：[1]广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520 [2]广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广州510520 [3]东莞市道路桥梁开发建设总公司,广东东莞511700

出　　处：《交通运输系统工程与信息》2015年第2期29-35,共7页Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology

基　　金：国家自然基金(71171061);广东省交通运输厅科技项目(502140002)

摘　　要：收费广场拥堵严重影响了高速路的通行效率和安全畅通.为找到驾驶员路径选择博弈的稳定策略,以更好地诱导驾驶员合理选择收费通道,提高收费站通行效率,缓解高速路收费广场拥堵问题,本文以驾驶员为研究对象,运用演化博弈的方法,通过'鹰鸽博弈'模型分析,建立收益矩阵,得到在不同成本条件下的两个演化稳定策略,并借助MATLAB软件和仿真演化的路径分析,验证了驾驶员在选择收费通道博弈中存在均衡点的分析结果.研究表明,存在混合策略是博弈的均衡点,诱导驾驶员的策略选择向均衡点靠近,能均衡各收费通道的车流量,有效减少收费广场的拥堵现象.The congestion of toll plaza reduces the efficiency of transportation, and poses negative effects on the safety and smoothness of highway. In order to find out the stable strategy of game theory for better guiding drivers to select toll channel legitimately, and improve the efficiency of transportation and the situation of toll plaza congestion. Drivers is considered as the object of study, and the approach of evolutionary game and the analysis of ＂Hawk and Dove game＂model are applied to obtain two evolutionary stable strategies that are under different cost conditions. By using the simulation of MATLAB software and the analysis of evolutionary path, it can be verified that there is equilibrium existing in the game when drivers choose toll channel. The result shows that mixed strategy is equilibrium of game, and to induce the strategic choices of drivers closing to the equilibrium can balance flow of each toll channel, which can efficiently relieve the congestion of the toll plazas.

关 键 词：交通运输经济 收费通道选择 演化博弈 驾驶员选择 演化稳定策略 

分 类 号：U268.6[机械工程—车辆工程]