基于委托-代理理论的国际石油合作财税体系比较  

Comparison of international petroleum cooperation fiscal systems based on principle-agent theory

作　　者：仇鑫华[1] 王震 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学工商管理学院,北京102249 [2]中国石油大学能源战略研究院,北京102249

出　　处：《中国石油大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第2期171-179,共9页Journal of China University of Petroleum(Edition of Natural Science)

基　　金：国家科技重大专项(2011ZX05030-006)

摘　　要：基于国际石油合作财税体系特征和油气投资生产的特点,构建实现政府收益长期最大化的委托-代理模型,并描述模型中的重要变量和参数;选择三种典型的国际石油财税体系,运用模型对其激励机制进行对比分析。结果表明,激励机制的设计是保障政府收益最大化的关键问题,应根据资源禀赋和自身条件选择合适的激励机制,当风险程度相同时,产品分成合同、矿费税收制合同、服务合同的激励效果递减。A mechanism design model that can maximize the profits of host government was built. A comparison of three typical fiscal systems was conducted to contrast the incentive effects by each mechanism. The results show that the designs of fiscal systems shall apply to specific characteristics of the underlying resource. A production sharing contract is the most effective model in motivating international oil and gas cooperation,while the royalty-tax contract and the service contract rank in the second and third place,respectively.

关 键 词：委托-代理理论 油气财税体系 机制设计 国际石油合作 

分 类 号：F062.5[经济管理—政治经济学] F416.22