中国互联网企业拒绝交易行为的反垄断法律规制探讨  

Probe into China's Antimonopoly Laws and Regulations on the Behavior of Refusal to Deal by Internet Enterprises

作　　者：张志伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学法学院,江西南昌330013

出　　处：《江西财经大学学报》2015年第3期121-128,共8页Journal of Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"反垄断法规制的国外典型案例梳理研究"(11BFX054)

摘　　要：互联网企业的拒绝交易行为往往具有明显的节约交易成本、推动市场进入和提高经营效率等合理性,但是较少存在防止搭便车和保障产品质量或品质的效率合理性。中国现行相关反垄断法律规则存在标准不明晰、可操作性差等不足。对于互联网企业拒绝交易行为的反垄断规制应当遵循"谦抑性"的基本原则,将"市场封锁效应"作为衡量互联网企业拒绝交易行为反竞争效应最主要的因素,并增加其他效应作为补充考察因素,重点关注互联网企业拒绝进入必需设备的行为,并引入"安全港"标准,在认定滥用行为时主要考察行为的反竞争效果而非反竞争意图。The behavior of refusal to deal by Internet enterprises usually has obvious rationalities, such as saving transaction cost, promoting market entry, improving operating efficiency, and so on. However, the efficiency rationalities, such as preventing free-riding and maintaining product quality, can be hardly found. China＇s existing laws and regulations concerning anti-monopoly have such deft- ciencies as unclear standards, poor operability, and so on. The basic principle of ＂modest restraining＂ should be foUowcd in the antitrust regulation on the behavior of refusal to deal by interact enterpris- es. It is proposed to regard the ＂market foreclosure effect＂ as the most important factor to measure the anti-competition effects of the behavior of refusal to deal by Internet enterprises, and add other effects as supplementary investigation factors. Close attention should be paid to the acts of refusal to enter the essential facilities by the Intemet enterprises. It is also suggested to introduce the standard of ＂safe harbor＂ ; when abuse behaviors are being identified, the primary investigation should be ap- plied to the anti-competition effects of the acts rather than the ante-competition intents.

关 键 词：互联网 拒绝交易 反垄断 必需设备 

分 类 号：DF414[政治法律—经济法学]