中国地方政府间的企业所得税竞争研究——基于面板数据空间滞后模型的实证分析  

CORPORATE INCOME TAX COMPETITION AMONG LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA——An Empirical Analysis of Panel Data Based on the Spatial Lag Model

作　　者：潘孝珍[1] 庞凤喜[2] 

机构地区：[1]杭州电子科技大学会计学院,邮政编码310018 [2]中南财经政法大学财税学院

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2015年第5期88-97,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"宏观税负;税负结构与结构性减税研究"(12&ZD044);教育部人文社科青年基金项目"两型社会视角下我国环境税体系重构研究"(10YJC790326)的资助

摘　　要：中国地方政府没有独立的税收立法权,但仍然可以通过企业所得税优惠开展中国式税收竞争。本文在构建省级企业所得税优惠衡量指标的基础上,使用面板数据空间滞后模型分析表明,中国地方政府间存在无序的策略互补式税收竞争,并且在企业所得税名义税收优惠上的竞争比实际税收优惠更为激烈。中央政府有必要从企业所得税名义税收优惠入手,采取措施规范地方政府间的企业所得税竞争行为,但同时也应该保持税收优惠政策本身及其实施效果的连续性。There is no independent legislative power of tax in China＇s local governments,but they still can take Chinese-style tax competition through preferential corporate income tax.Based on the construc-tion of provincial preferential corporate income tax measurement,this paper uses the spatial lag model of panel data to conclude that,there is complementary strategy type of tax competition between local govern-ments in China,and the competition in normal preferential corporate income tax is more intense than real preferential tax.The central government should start from the nominal preferential corporate income tax, take measures to regulate corporate income tax competition behavior between local governments,but should also keep the continuity of government＇s preferential tax policy and its implementation effect.

关 键 词：地方政府 企业所得税竞争 名义税收优惠 实际税收优惠 

分 类 号：F812.42[经济管理—财政学]