基于博弈论的门限签名体制分析与构造  

Analysis and construction for threshold signature scheme based on game theory

作　　者：王洁[1,2] 蔡永泉[1] 田有亮[3] 

机构地区：[1]北京工业大学计算机学院,北京100124 [2]山西师范大学数学与计算机学院,山西临汾041004 [3]贵州大学理学院,贵州贵阳550025

出　　处：《通信学报》2015年第5期148-155,共8页Journal on Communications

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(61170221;61363068);北京市自然科学基金资助项目(1102003)~~

摘　　要：为了使门限签名体制更具有普适性,引入了"理性参与人"的概念,将所有参与者视为理性的个体,任何阶段以最大化自身利益为目标。基于博弈论对密钥生成和签名合成阶段各参与者的策略和效用进行了分析,证明了在传统门限签名方案中理性参与者没有动机参与签名,导致无法完成对消息的签名,并提出了理性密钥分发和理性签名合成的解决机制。经分析该方法能更好地满足实际需求。The concept of ＂rational player＂ is introduced to make threshold signature system more general. In this new primitive, all players are regarded as rational individuals in the sense that they always try to maximize their profits as the goal at any phases. Each player＇s strategy and utility in key generation and signature synthesis phases are analyzed based on game theory. It is proved that rational players have no motivation to participate in signature in traditional threshold signature scheme, which might cause it impossible to complete threshold signature. Finally, the mechanism of rational key distribution and rational signature synthesis is proposed. Analysis shows the new method is more applicable than the previous schemes in the real-world applications.

关 键 词：博弈论 门限签名 双线性对 BDH假设 纳什均衡 

分 类 号：TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]