公共选择视角下中国地方政府竞争与环境规制政策执行机制  

A Public Choice Perspective Study on the Competitions among Chinese Local Governments and the Environmental Regulation Policy Implementation Mechanism

作　　者：张为杰[1] 郑尚植[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《当代经济管理》2015年第6期41-47,共7页Contemporary Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目<城镇化进程中"碳锁定"的形成机理;风险测度与解锁策略研究>(71403041);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目<财政竞争;政治锦标赛与公共支出结构偏向>(14Yjc790179);辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目<辽宁新兴产业与传统产业协同发展路径与政策研究>(L13DJY063)资助

摘　　要：环境规制的实质是一个公共选择过程。文章以皮科克的政治市场结构理论为切入点,运用公共选择理论,分析中国环境规制过程中初级政治市场、政策供给市场以及政策执行市场的特有方面。研究表明,制度结构决定了环境规制中政治市场结构的独特运作机制。财政分权与政治晋升机制使地方政府热衷于为增长而竞争。公众无法有效约束地方政府行为,而企业与地方政府在一定程度上又存在着共容利益。在政治与经济双重逻辑下,地方政府倾向于采取环境规制"趋底"的竞争策略,进而导致了环境规制失灵。Environmental regulation is essentially a process of public choice. Taking Peacock＇s political market structure theory as a starting point, this paper used the public choice theory to analyze the unique aspect of primary political market, policy supply market and implementation market in the process of China＇s environmental regulations. Research shows that institutional structure determines the unique mechanism of political market structure in the process of environmental regulation. Fiscal decentralization and political promotion mechanisms enable local governments keen to compete for growth. The public could not effectively constrain local government＇s behaviors, and firms and local governments own encompassing interest to some extents. In the political and economic double logic, local governments tend to race to the bottom in environmental regulation. Based on the analysis of the environmental regulation by public choice process, this paper put forward relevant policy recommendations.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 环境规制 公共选择 政治市场结构 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济]