经济增长业绩与地方官员晋升的关联性再审视——新理论和基于地级市数据的新证据  

A New Re-examination of the Relationship between Economic Performance and Local Leader' Promotion:New Theory and New Evidence from City-level Data

作　　者：罗党论[1] 佘国满[2] 陈杰[3] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院 [2]复旦大学经济学院 [3]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2015年第2期1145-1172,共28页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902024;71173045;71003108;71002057);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大攻关项目(13JZD009);上海市曙光学者计划(13SG35);中山大学经济研究所基地建设经费项的资助

摘　　要：本文首先从政权合法性和政权权威的视角重新阐释官员晋升与经济增长业绩间的关联性,将其更多地视为官员选拨合法性的体现。利用1999—2009年的地级市数据进行研究表明,官员在任期内的相对经济增速与其晋升显著正相关,而前任官员的经济绩效被视为当期官员的"标杆"。同时,具有高校或高管背景、拥有交流经历、政治生涯表现更好的官员晋升概率更大,但它们不会弱化经济绩效与晋升的关系。此外,我们通过对经济增长进行分解后发现,具有经济效率(TFP)提升的经济增长与晋升的关系更强。Founded on the perspectives of ＂political legibility and authoritative govern- ment＂, the study discusses the relationship between local leader＇s promotion and economic growth in Chinese cities from 1999--2009. The research confirms that better economic growth significantly boosts the promotion probability of the secretary, while the economic performance of the immediate predecessor acts as a benchmark. Meanwhile, secretaries with both work experiences at university or state-owned enterprise and rotating experiences are more likely to be promoted. Nonetheless, these elements don＇t contribute to weaken the strong relationship between economic performance and promotion. Furthermore, the eeo nomic rise stimulated by TFP is linked closely with the promotion.

关 键 词：地方官员晋升 经济增长 经济效率 

分 类 号：F124.1[经济管理—世界经济] D630[政治法律—政治学]