信息不对称下委托模式融通仓银行对第三方物流的激励和监督  

On Supervision and Incentive Mechanism of FTW of Principal-Agent Model Under Informational Asymmetry

作　　者：周雪敏[1] 徐鹏[2] 邓哲锋[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学财务处,重庆400715 [2]西南政法大学管理学院,重庆401120 [3]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《西南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第5期82-87,共6页Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(14YJC630152);中国博士后科学基金项目(2014M562504XB);重庆市博士后资助项目(Xm2014070);重庆市教委科学技术项目(KJ1400106)

摘　　要：风险控制为融通仓业务顺利开展的关键环节,而银行促使第三方物流(3PL)努力工作是其中核心的问题之一.该文运用委托代理理论,研究信息不对称下银行对3PL的监督激励机制.所建模型考虑了银行的监督成本,讨论不同监督力度对第三方物流努力水平、激励系数、固定报酬及代理成本的影响.结果显示,在激励基础上进行监督,可促使第三方物流更加努力地工作;银行存在一个愿意监督的条件—"有效监督集"及最优监督水平.结论对防范第三方物流道德风险、提高银行开展融通仓的积极性具有重要的现实意义.Controlling risk is the key to the effective operation of finance ,transportation and warehouse （FTW） ,and it is a core issue that the bank makes third-party logistics （3PL） to work hard .Principal-a-gent theory has been applied to study supervision and incentive mechanism of bank-3PL under information-al asymmetry .With the model ,the cost of bank supervision has been considered ,the effect of different su-pervision levels on 3PL effort levels been discussed ,factor been encouraged ,and remuneration and agency costs been fixed .The results showed that the work of 3PL can be promoted by supervision based on the in-centive;there is a condition for banks to supervise-“principles would like to supervise”as well as the opti-mal level of supervision .The results have realistic significance in preventing 3PL＆#39;s moral risk and impro-ving banks＆#39; initiative to participate in warehouse receipt pledge .

关 键 词：融通仓 信息不对称 激励监督机制 愿意监督集 最优监督水平 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]