作为一种概率知觉模式的Affordance——对Affordance图灵机模型的反驳  

Affordance as a Pattern of Probabilistic Perception——Criticizing Wells' Turing Machine Model of Affordance

作　　者：薛少华[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2015年第3期33-39,共7页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：国家留学基金委员会中国人民大学--哈佛大学联合培养博士生项目(201206360083);国家社科基金重大项目"认知科学对哲学的挑战--心灵与认知哲学重大理论问题研究"(11&ZD187)

摘　　要：作为认知科学中具身认知研究范式的创立者,吉布森及其直接知觉理论受到极大关注。对于该理论核心概念的Affordance,如何提供一个精确的理论模型对其进行形式化描述,在认知科学和认知哲学界仍处于激烈争论之中。其中,威尔斯(2002)提出以图灵机作为Affordance概念的恰当模型,这是Affordance概念与人工智能领域的交叉理论研究。然而,通过对吉布森关于Affordance理论的分析,我发现图灵机模型无法解释Affordance所包含的随机性这个本质特征。因此,在对威尔斯(2002)进行反驳的基础上,我将给出一个基于概率知觉的Affordance新定义。As the root of embodiment cognition trends of cognitive science,Gibson and his direct perception theory have drawn great attention. However,as the core concept of direct perception theory,there still exists disagreement on the accurate model of affordance in the field of cognitive science. Turing machine model of affordance,an emerging theory proposed by Wells in 2002,is fit for the modeling of affordance. This is the first time that overlapping study occurs as for the concepts affordance and artificial intelligence. Nevertheless,by analyzing the feature of Gibson’s description of affordance,the author shows that the Turing machine model has inherent drawbacks in explaining probabilistic characteristic of affordance. Thus,according to the objection of Wells（2002）,this paper tries to present a definition of the pattern of affordance probabilistic perception.

关 键 词：AFFORDANCE 图灵机 行动可能性 概率知觉 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]