完全信息静态博弈下农业保险分析——以甘肃省为例  

Agricultural Insurance Analysis Under the Complete Information Static Game——Taking Gansu Province As An Example

作　　者：姚飞[1] 吴应珍[1] 

机构地区：[1]甘肃农业大学人文学院,兰州730070

出　　处：《中国农学通报》2015年第13期279-283,共5页Chinese Agricultural Science Bulletin

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"西北欠发达地区循环农业法律制度建设研究"(10BFX079)

摘　　要：为促进甘肃省农业保险政策的完善及提高农户对农业保险的有效需求,进而促进甘肃省农业保险的可持续发展,针对农业保险市场上政府、保险公司和农户三大利益主体之间的相互影响关系,采用完全信息静态博弈理论对各个利益主体的收益进行博弈分析,同时结合甘肃省实地调研数据,选取逻辑回归分析方法提取影响农户参与农业保险的主要因素。分析得出:在保险公司和农户的博弈中,保险公司在农户有投保意愿时应当做出的积极回应为不经营策略,如果选择经营,则会损失更多;农户在保险公司做出经营策略的时候,应当积极投保,这样才能获得收益,如果保险公司选择不经营,农户无论做出什么选择,都会损失预防灾情的资金,并且如果农户选择投保还会损失更多;在政府与保险公司的博弈中,可以看出,政府的最佳收益为0,说明政府不支持保险公司进行农业保险业务是最佳策略;而对保险公司来说,只有在政府支持的情况下,才能获得最佳收益。这说明,只有在政府支持的情况下,保险公司经营农业保险的积极性才能提高。逻辑回归分析表明文化程度、务农人数、耕地面积、农业收入占家庭收入比重、了解农业保险程度对农户农业保险购买行为具有显著的影响。In order to perfect the policy of Gansu agricultural insurance, improve farmers ＇ effective demand for agricultural insurance and then promote the sustainable development of Gansu agricultural insurance, this research analyzed the profits of the major interest subjects in agricultural insurance market by constructing the complete information static game model, which was based on the interplay among the government, insurance companies and farmers. And the main factors influencing the purchase of agricultural insurance were extracted by logistic regression analysis model combined with the survey data of Gansu Province. The results showed that the positive response for insurance companies was not to operate agricultural insurance when farmers had insurance willingness in the game between insurance companies and farmers. It would cost more if the insurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance. Farmers should be active to insure to take profits when insurance companies chose to operate agricultural insurance. Farmers would definitely lose money preventing disaster when insurance companies chose not to operate agricultural insurance and farmers would lose more if they chose to buy agricultural insurance. Best interest of government was 0 in the game between government and insurance companies, and optimal strategy of government was not to support the insurance company to operate agricultural insurance. But insurance companies would get the best interest only when government supported agricultural insurance, so insurance companies would not improve the enthusiasm to operate agricultural insurance without the support of government. Logistic regression analysis proved that farmer＇ s education degree, the number of farming in a family, farmland area, agricultural income proportion and the knowledge about agricultural insurance mainly influenced farmers＇ behavior to purchase agricultural insurance.

关 键 词：农业保险 博弈分析 经济学分析 逻辑回归分析 

分 类 号：F840.66[经济管理—保险]