基于网络外部性的网络融合经济学分析  

Economics analysis on convergence of network externalities

作　　者：杨洵[1] 张权[1] 王红亮[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710121

出　　处：《西安邮电大学学报》2015年第3期109-112,124,共5页Journal of Xi’an University of Posts and Telecommunications

基　　金：陕西省软科学研究计划资助项目(2014KRM18);陕西省教育厅人文社科重点研究基地科研计划资助项目(14JZ047)

摘　　要：基于网络外部性理论,构建平台商博弈模型。利用该模型分析融合和非融合条件下的社会福利、消费者剩余和平台商收益,结果显示,平台之间融合比不融合情况下的社会福利水平和消费者剩余更高,同质化竞争情况下,网络平台商的自身利益可能受损,拒绝融合。不同平台商在服务上保持一定的差异性,是顺利实现网络融合的基础。Base on network extemalities theory, a game model of platform operation enterprises is built in this paper. By using the model, the social welfare, consumer surplus and economic bene- fits of platform operation enterprises under the circumstances with convergence and without con- vergence are analyzed. Results show that social welfare and consumer surplus will be more with convergence. But considering self-benefit, network platform operation enterprises will refuse convergence. Therefore, keeping the different platform operation enterprises is the base of the convergence of networks, and it should be kept as unique service advantage.

关 键 词：网络外部性 网络融合 平台 博弈 

分 类 号：F049[经济管理—政治经济学]