不确定信息下的内生激励与企业效率  

Endogenous Incentive and Enterprise Efficiency under the Information Uncertainty

作　　者：钱宁宇[1,2] 郑长军[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,邮政编码430074 [2]香港城市大学商学院管理科学系,邮政编码430074

出　　处：《经济研究》2015年第5期104-117,共14页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“资本充足约束下银行风险承担行为与监管研究”(71173077)资助

摘　　要：传统研究容易忽略政府间接干预下自主经营企业内生激励对自身生产效率的影响。本文通过梳理政治关联——政治负担这一政府间接干预机制,建立了以企业内生激励为视角的竞争模型来重新认识企业的行为决策。文章发现,尽管造成企业效率低下,但主动政治负担建立政治关联获取相关效用成为面临市场竞争的改制企业的最优选择,揭示了目前仍广泛存在的软预算约束现象的机理。在此激励扭曲下,消费者剩余提升的同时社会福利总体水平依然低于最优社会福利;更重要的是,如果效率扭曲无法通过完善竞争环境来纠正,改革开放的红利将逐渐消失。本文认为,在深入市场化改革的同时推进政府"简政放权",遏制政府间接干预是进一步企业改革提升效率的关键。The traditional researches usually ignore the impact of endogenous incentive on operation independent enterprises＇ efficiency when government＇s inferehce is indirect. We build up an incentive based firms competition model to review the firms＇ behavior and action strategy based on the indirect influence mechanism between political connection and political burden. Based on our model, due to government＇s rent-setting behavior, firms＇ optimal strategy is to volunteer to take the political burden and form the political connection, and the model rectifies and extends the classic soft budget constraint theory and reveals mechanism of the current renewal phenomenon correctly. We also find that although consumer surplus will increase but the total welfare is lower than first best welfare based on the incentive distortion and what＇s more the distortion will not be rectified by perfect competition environment, the bonus of opening-up will vanish. So we think suppress government indirect inference and the privilege of rent-setting is the key to improve enterprises＇ efficiency and the direction to reform.

关 键 词：企业效率 内生激励 政治关联效用 市场化改革 软预算约束 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学] F272[政治法律—中外政治制度]