晋升激励、攫取之手与地方财政超收  

Promotion Incentive, Grabbing Hand and Excess Revenue of Local Governments

作　　者：冯辉[1] 沈肇章[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《当代财经》2015年第6期35-44,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：以政治激励和新财政集权理论为基础,并运用2000-2012年省级面板数据实证分析地方财政超收。在晋升激励之下,地方政府会策略性地影响预算编制所依据的GDP计划增长率和官员政绩考核所依据的核心指标(即GDP实际增长率),因而GDP超计划增长为财政超收奠定了经济基础。分税制改革后,中央财政集权程度加强,地方政府在财政压力下提高税收征管效率,财政超收与中央攫取之手正相关。地方政府在发展高税行业带来税收超预算增长的情况下会调整年初预算而追求超支,实证结果表明非农化程度与财政超收负相关。因此,在完善官员政绩考核制度的同时,需要加强人大的监督职能。Based on the theories of political incentive and new fiscal centralization, this paper conducts an empirical analysis of excess revenue of local governments by making use of the provin- cial panel data from 2000 to 2012. Under the promotion incentive, local governments will tactically affect the planned GDP growth rate on which the budgeting is based and the core index （namely the actual GDP growth rate） on which the government officials performance assessment is based. Thus, GDP growth beyond the plan lays the economic foundation for excess public revenue. After the re- form of tax distribution system, the central government has strengthened fiscal centralization, so the local governments under tremendous fiscal pressure have to improve the efficiency of tax collection and management. If developing high-tax industries can bring about tax growth beyond budgeting, the local governments would adjust the budget made at the beginning of the year in order to pursue overspending. The empirical result indicates that the degree of non-agriculturization is negatively corre- lated with excess revenue. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance the supervision function of the Na- tional People＇ s Congress when perfecting the achievements appraisal system for government officials.

关 键 词：晋升激励 攫取之手 地方财政超收 现代预算制度 

分 类 号：F812.41[经济管理—财政学]