政府绩效评估中博弈行为的防范之道:理论与国际经验  

Countermeasures to Gaming in Government Performance Measurement: Theories and International Experiences

作　　者：周志忍[1] 徐艳晴[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,政治发展与政府管理研究所 [2]北京大学政府管理学院 [3]海南大学政治与公共管理学院

出　　处：《中国行政管理》2015年第6期140-145,共6页Chinese Public Administration

基　　金：教育部哲学社会科学研究重大课题攻关项目"中国地方政府绩效评价体系与管理机制研究"(编号:05JZDH0019);北京大学"国家治理协同创新中心"成果

摘　　要：政府绩效评估一直为信息失真所困扰,博弈行为则是信息失真的重要原因,博弈行为的防治之道相应成为国际相关领域的重要研究主题。本文系统梳理相关理论成果和国际经验,旨在为我国提供启示和借鉴。具体内容包括社会规范建设、提高评估体系的认同度、优化绩效指标体系、改善激励机制、强化监督力度。Government performance measurement has long been a main cause for this. Consequently, motivations for perplexed by information distortion and gaming behavior is cheating and its countermeasures have been an important topic in the field of performance measurement. This paper provides a primary review of the literature and anti - cheating practices overseas in an attempt to facilitate theoretical research and the fight against gaming in China. The main anti - cheating strategies covered include construction of favourable social norms, strengthening exter- nal monitoring and supervision, enhancing approbation among staff of the performance measurement system, dy- namic optimization of performance measures, and improvement of motivation mechanisms.

关 键 词：绩效评估 信息失真 博弈行为 

分 类 号：D630[政治法律—政治学]