服务外包质量监管博弈研究  

Study on quality supervision games of the outsourcing service

作　　者：李永飞[1] 许银行 

机构地区：[1]西安邮电大学经济与管理学院,西安710061 [2]武汉市政工程设计研究院有限责任公司,武汉430015

出　　处：《现代制造工程》2015年第6期53-59,103,共8页Modern Manufacturing Engineering

基　　金：高等学校博士点专项基金项目(20090201110031);陕西省交通运输厅科研项目(15-01R);西安邮电大学青年基金项目(ZL2014-44;ZL2014-47)

摘　　要：应用Nash均衡博弈理论研究了服务外包供应链中服务外包的发包方、外包提供商、服务外包质量监管方(指政府质量监管机构,简称政府)三方质量监管博弈问题。研究表明:服务外包供应链博弈三方无纯Nash均衡稳定解,只有混合Nash均衡稳定解且服务外包质量监管概率不受服务是否外包概率的影响。发包方预计外包潜在收益小于自营收益时,发包方偏向自营而不外包,否则,发包方偏向于外包且外包后倾向于外包提供商合谋,以规避服务外包质量监管方的监管,此时,服务外包质量监管方应加大监管力度。通常情况下,双方合谋概率越大,发生质量问题的概率也越大,服务外包质量监管方监管概率也越大。以上结论对服务外包质量监管理论与实践均有一定的参考价值。Use the Nash equilibrium game theory to study the three quality game problems in the outsourcing supply chain among the outsourcer,the outsourcing service provider and the quality supervision organization. The results are shown that： there is not the stable solution of pure Nash equilibrium in the outsourcing supply chain three game and only is the mixed-Nash equilibrium solution. The mix equilibrium supervision probability of service outsourcing is not impacted by the probability of outsourcing. If the outsourcer potential benefits of outsourcing is expected to return less than the self-employed, then the outsourcer should be dumped on the self-employed and not relative to outsoureing, otherwise, the outsourcer should be more inclined to outsourcing and tends to collusion after he does outsouree. The greater probability of collusion arises, the greater probability of the government reg- ulatory authority will be monitor;the smaller probability of collusion arises, the smaller probability of the government regulatory authority will be monitor. General, the greater probability of collusion arises the greater probability of quality problems arises and the greater supervision probability of government regulation arises. These conclusions have some reference values on the quality supervision of the service outsoureing theory and practice.

关 键 词：服务外包 供应链 质量监管 博弈 

分 类 号：TH16[机械工程—机械制造及自动化]