软预算约束下中国地方政府过度负债的形成机制分析  

Research of Soft Budget Constraint Leading to Local Government's Over-debts in China

作　　者：廖家勤[1] 石琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632

出　　处：《首都经济贸易大学学报》2015年第4期76-82,共7页Journal of Capital University of Economics and Business

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目"和谐社会视角下深化地方预算编制制度改革研究"(11YJA810007)

摘　　要：中国地方政府存在过度负债的行为倾向,这与预算约束呈现了背离之势。研究地方政府突破预算约束而过度负债的行为机制,可以从客观和主观两方面入手:客观上,由于分税制、项目制、晋升激励机制等体制的不完善,导致地方政府负债过度;主观上,地方政府和金融机构"经济人"的本质诱发道德风险而使地方政府过度负债。抑制地方政府过度负债的行为,关键在于建立规范的地方融资举债机制,避免金融道德风险。It is a general tendency that local governments＇ debts in China are excessive ,which is a violation to the budget constraint. To research the mechanism of the excessive debts, the authors starts from two aspects ob- jective and subjective. Objectively, as the systems of tax allocation, project system and promotion incentives are im- perfect, local governments need to live on loans. And subjectively, because local governments and financial institu- tions have the nature of ＂economic person＂ inducing moral hazards,which lead governments into debts. The key to restrain the excessive debts of local governments is to establish a standardized debt financing mechanism and to a- void financial moral hazards.

关 键 词：地方政府债务 软预算约束 道德风险 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]