集群溢出对双寡头Bertrand竞争价格均衡的影响分析  

Analysis of cluster spillovers' impact on the price equilibrium among duopoly Bertrand competition

作　　者：龙剑军 赵骅[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《科研管理》2015年第2期145-151,共7页Science Research Management

基　　金：重庆市决策咨询与管理创新计划重点项目<产业集群协作研究-面向重庆实践的方案>(cstc2013jccx B0021)

摘　　要：基于集群企业的有限理性,采用两种不同的价格调整机制Navie和GD,在企业集群中构建起具集群溢出的双寡头Bertrand竞争博弈模型,分析了集群溢出对离散动态系统下价格均衡的影响,并进行了数值模拟。研究表明:一是集群内寡头企业产品价格的动态演化依赖于离散系统参数的取值,混沌或分岔状态下价格初始取值的细微差别可能导致演化结果的较大差异;二是提高集群溢出有利于维持有限理性寡头企业产品价格的稳定以及预防混沌市场的出现,增加博弈达到Nash均衡的可能性。Based on the bounded rationality of cluster enterprises, this paper constructs a duopoly Bertrand game model in enterprise cluster with cluster spillovers features, by adopting two different adjustment mechanisms, Navie and GD, this paper also analyzes and discusses the effect of cluster spillovers on equilibrium prices under the discrete dynamical system, and finally carry through the numerical simulation. This research shows that： the evolution track of product prices depends on the values of discrete system parameters, which means the nuances of the initial value in the chaos or bifurcate state can lead to remarkable difference of evolution results ; furthermore, increasing cluster spillovers contributes to stabilizing the product prices of the bounded enterprises, preventing the emergence of chaos market and improving the probability to reach Nash Equilibrium.

关 键 词：BERTRAND竞争 集群溢出 企业集群 调整机制 

分 类 号：C931[经济管理—管理学]