农村集体建设用地流转驱动力的博弈分析  

A Game Theory-Based Analysis of the Driving Forces of Rural Collective Construction Land

作　　者：龙凤[1] 赵伟[1] 张智红 谢德体[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆工商大学旅游与国土资源学院,重庆400067 [2]重庆农村土地交易所,重庆400067 [3]西南大学资源环境学院,重庆400716

出　　处：《西南大学学报（自然科学版）》2015年第3期151-157,共7页Journal of Southwest University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：国家自然基金资助项目(41101568);重庆市决策咨询与管理创新项目(CSTC2013jccxA0158);重庆市教委科技项目(KJ120726)

摘　　要：在我国现有土地制度的框架下,集体建设用地流转虽不被允许,但流转的现实需求却真实存在.为探究驱使集体建设用地流转的动因,本文运用博弈论,构建博弈模型,从内部因素分析集体建设用地流转的动因.研究发现:(1)集体建设用地转出方、土地使用方及土地管理方在比较利益的驱使下,经过反复的博弈,其最终的混合战略纳什均衡是转出集体建设用地,转向集体建设用地和允许集体建设用地流转.(2)在流转收益分配方面,村集体需根据农村集体正常生活和生产需要来确定两者之间的收益分配比例以及对农户的补偿额.政府在保障农民社会保障和集体经济组织可持续发展的情况下,主要通过开征相关税种获得增值效益.In the framework of the existing land system in China, collective construction land transfer is not allowed, but the demand of circulation of collective construction land does exist. In order to explore the driving motivation of collective construction land transfer, this paper uses the game theory to construct a game model and analyze the internal driving factors for collective construction land transfer. The results show that. （1） driven by their respective comparative advantages, collective construction[ transferees, transferors and land managers choose transfer collective construction land after repeated games-a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium; （2） for the allocation of the transfer income, the village collective should deter- mine the proportion of income distribution and compensation for farmers according to the requirements of their normal life and production. When the government shares value-added benefits, it should take the so- cial security for farmers and the sustainable development of collective economic organization into considera- tion and achieve it mainly by levying related taxes.

关 键 词：集体建设用地流转 博弈 流转驱动力 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]