基于Swarm的逆向物流渠道冲突协调  

Coordination of reverse logistics channel conflicts based on Swarm

作　　者：刘龙青[1] 张国庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江农林大学经济管理学院,浙江临安311300

出　　处：《福建农林大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2015年第3期66-70,共5页Journal of Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

基　　金：教育部人文社科青年项目(13YJC790096);浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目(13JDN F01YB);浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地"浙江省农民发展研究中心"项目(13JDNF01YB)

摘　　要：社会化逆向物流实施过程中存在渠道主体间的利益冲突,需要监管部门协调和引导。通过构建监管部门和散户间的重复博弈模型,利用Swarm平台对模型进行仿真研究,分析不同政策环境下散户的经营行为变化。结果表明:只有设计奖励和惩罚相结合的激励机制,才能有效协调冲突。该结论对监管部门制定逆向物流政策法规有较好的参考价值。Interest conflicts between the main channels in the socialization of reverse logistics implementation process need the supervision department to coordinate and guide. The model of repeated game between supervision department and retails is constructed and simulated applying Swarm. Analysis of the change of retails’ operating behaviors in different policy environment is conducted.The results show that only through designing of incentive mechanism combining with reward and punishment,the conflicts are coordinated effectively. The conclusion offers a reference to the supervision department to design policies and regulations to deal with the reverse logistics channel conflicts.

关 键 词：逆向物流 渠道冲突 SWARM仿真 

分 类 号：F252.19[经济管理—国民经济] F253