土地财政的根源:财政压力还是投资冲动  

The Source of Land Finance:Fiscal Pressure or Investment Incentives

作　　者：范子英[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学公共经济与管理学院,上海200433

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2015年第6期18-31,共14页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目"税收执法;企业避税与企业绩效:基于所得税分享改革的研究"(批准号71303083);教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目"财政转移支付对地方政府土地出让行为的影响研究"(批准号11YJC790039);上海财经大学中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目"政治关联的经济增长效应"(批准号2015110120)

摘　　要：近十年来,土地财政成为中国财政体制中最受关注的问题,一个主要的假说是地方政府面临了巨大的财政压力,出让土地获得收入是地方政府的"无奈之举"。本文利用1998—2007年部长更换的自然实验对该假说予以检验。研究发现:新任部长会显著降低其来源地城市的财政压力,这些部长会利用排他性的权力对中央的转移支付分配产生影响,使得其来源地的城市获得的转移支付增加12%;部长来源地的财政压力变化没有对这些地区的土地出让行为产生影响,无论是土地出让面积还是土地出让收入都没有随着财政压力的下降而减少;土地财政的真实原因是投资冲动,即使是中央指定用途的转移支付,都被用于生产性的基础设施建设,而不是基本公共服务的提供。因此,从本文引申的政策建议是,由于财政压力并不构成地方政府出让土地的真实原因,期冀通过向地方放权的方式来解决土地财政问题是不可行的,未来的改革方向应该是把重点放在土地财政制度上。Land finance is the most important issue in China during the last decade, one explanation is that the local governments are pushed to sell the land because they have great fiscal pressure. This paper uses the natural experiment of newly appointed minister in China between 1998 and 2007 to test the hypothesis, we get several finds. Fistly, newly elected ministers significantly reduce the fiscal pressure of their hometown, those ministers will change the allocation of central earmarked grants and increase 12% grants for their hometown. Secondly, the reductions of fiscal pressure of ministers＇ hometown have no impact on the land finance behavior, the area and revenue of land sales have not changed. Thirdly, the real cause of land finance is the impulse to invest, even the earmarked grants are used for productive infrastructure but not the basic public service. The policy implications of this paper is that the future reform should focus on the land leasehold policy, while the decentralization is not a feasible way because the fiscal pressure is not the real cause of land finance.

关 键 词：土地财政 财政压力 转移支付 部长更换 

分 类 号：F812.7[经济管理—财政学]